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I. INTRODUCTION
"To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the
heaven[.]"' This famous passage inspired Paul E. Wilson to title his book, A
Time to Lose: Representing Kansas in Brown v. Board of Education,2 a recount-
* The author is a prosecutor for the Solicitor's Office in Gwinnett County, Georgia, and a former
Assistant Professor at John Marshall Law School in Atlanta, Georgia. She earned her J.D. from the University
of Tennessee.
1. Ecclesiastes 3:1. See also Ecclesiastes 3:6. The passage cites the words, "a time to lose."
2. PAUL E. WILSON, A TIME TO LOSE: REPRESENTING KANSAS IN Brown v. Board of Education (1995).
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ing of his participation in Brown v. Board of Education.' Wilson, a Distinguished
Professor of Law Emeritus at the Kansas School of Law, represented the state of
Kansas in these landmark decisions.' Although segregation of American schools
was common in 1952, Wilson personally viewed it as immoral. Nevertheless, he
represented Kansas based on his belief that his role as an attorney demanded pro-
fessionalism.' Indeed, his defense was based on Supreme Court precedents.6
Deemed the "Case of the Century,"7 Brown officially ended, in the context
of public education, the "separate but equal" doctrine handed down in Plessy v.
Ferguson.' In the words of Chief Justice Earl Warren:
We conclude that in the field of public education the doc-
trine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the
plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions
have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained
of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.9
The importance of the decision in Brown cannot be overstated. "It is beyond
dispute ... one of the most celebrated political and social events of this century.""
"[I]ts impact on public education - indeed on the entire social fabric of America
- has been profound and pervasive."'" Today, however, in the year of its fiftieth
anniversary, many of its precepts are being revisited. Should Brown be interpret-
ed to mandate integration, or simply to prohibit dejure segregation? What is the
status of Brown as a precedent in the beginning of this twenty-first century?
This article will explore the impact of Brown, its legacy and aftermath, and
the recent revisitation of its principles. Part I will delve into the historical back-
drop of the Brown cases. Part II will present an analysis of the famous decision.
In Part III, the author will discuss the aftermath of Brown. Part IV will focus on
the modem implications of Brown and the current controversies regarding the
"questionable social science research"' 2 involved in the original decision.
Finally, the author will write a conclusion based on the information gathered in
this study.
3. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown 1]; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter Brown I].
4. Sandra Craig Mckenzie, A Time to Lose: Representing Kansas in Brown v. Board of Education by
PaulE. Wilson, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 757, 758 (1995) (book review).
5. Id. at 759.
6. Id. at 758-59.
7. Paul E. Wilson, The Genesis of Brown v. Board of Education, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 7, 7 (Fall
1996).
8. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
9. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495.
10. Davidson M. Douglas, The Promise of Brown Forty Years Later: Introduction, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 337, 337 (1995).
11. Wilson, supra note 7, at 7.
12. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Circumstances in the United States
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was adopted in 1868
guaranteeing Equal Protection to all citizens:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.' 3
The Fourteenth Amendment came into effect three years after the conclusion of
the Civil War." It represented "an affirmative step toward mending the lingering
vestiges of slavery and race oppression."
'' 5
Despite this guarantee of equal protection regardless of race, however, the
Supreme Court would declare twenty years later, in Plessy v. Ferguson,'" that
requiring the races to use separate facilities did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment so long as those facilities were equal.17 Plessy dealt with a
Louisiana law which required citizens of the African-American race to occupy
separate railroad cars from those of the white race.'8 Plessy, the plaintiff, was of
mixed ethnic descent. He was seven-eighths Caucasian and one-eighth African-
American. His race was not discernible. Yet when he occupied a seat in a pas-
senger train's coach designated for whites only, he was ordered to vacate and go
to the appropriate coach. 9 When Plessy refused, he was forcibly removed from
the train and charged with a criminal violation of the law.2" The Court reasoned:
Laws permitting, and even requiring .. .separation [of the
races], in places where they are liable to be brought into contact,
do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the
other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as
within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of
their police power. The most common instance of this is con-
13. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. Zebie A. Grayson, Comment, Marshall's Dream Deferred: Almost Four Decades After Brown, The
Vestiges of De Jure Segregation Linger as the Implementation Process Continues, 20 S.U. L. REv. 53, 54
(1993).
15. Id. at 55.
16. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
17. Id. at 537.
18. Id. at 542.
19. Id. at 541.
20. Id. at 542.
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nected with the establishment of separate schools for white and
colored children, which have been held to be a valid exercise of
the legislative power even by courts of states where the political
rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly
enforced."
Thus, the Court placed its stamp of approval on the "separate but equal" doctrine
as applied to public education in American schools.
Three years later, in Cumming v. Board of Education,22 the Supreme Court
ruled that Richmond County, Georgia, did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection provision when it failed to offer its African-
American students a public high school to attend, although providing one for its
white students. 3 The school board argued that funds were insufficient to main-
tain the high school, since it was already providing primary schools for the
African-American children.
[W]e cannot say that this action.., was, within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment, a denial by the state to the plaintiffs
and to those associated with them of the equal protection of the
laws or of any privileges belonging to them as citizens of the
United States. . . .[T]he education of the people in schools
maintained by state taxation is a matter belonging to the respec-
tive states, and any interference on the part of Federal authority
with the management of such schools cannot be justified except
in the case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights
secured by the supreme law of the land.24
The "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy was never addressed in this case.
Then, in 1927, the Supreme Court ruled, once again, that the regulation of a
state's public schools was solely within that state's discretion. In Gong Lum v.
Rice,21 a nine-year old girl of Chinese descent was refused admission to a public
Mississippi school designated for white students.26 The Board of Education
demanded that she attend the school designated for the children of African-
American descent. There were no schools established for those of Chinese
descent. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Mississippi Supreme
Court.27 "The decision is within the discretion of the state in regulating its public
schools, and does not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment."28 Again, the
"separate but equal" doctrine was not addressed.
21. Id. at 544.
22. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
23. Id. at 544-45.
24. Id. at 545.
25. 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
26. Id. at 80.
27. Id. at 87.
28. Id.
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Cases involving issues in higher education followed. In Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada,29 an African-American student sought admission to the
University of Missouri School of Law." Missouri provided no law school for its
African-American citizens. The state offered to pay the student's tuition to
attend an out-of-state law school. However, the Supreme Court ruled this time
that Missouri was required to provide its citizens with equal access to education,
regardless of race.
It is said that Missouri ... is the only State in the Union which
has established a separate university for negroes on the same
basis as the state university for white students. But, commend-
able as is that action, the fact remains that instruction in law for
negroes is not now afforded by the State, ... and that the State
excludes negroes from the advantages of the law school it has
established at the University of Missouri. It is manifest that this
discrimination ...would constitute a denial of equal protec-
tion. 1
Later, in Sweatt v. Painter,32 the Court required the University of Texas Law
School to admit an African-American student, even though Texas provided a
separate law school for its black students. 3 This decision was based on the find-
ing that the school for African-Americans offered an education of unequal quali-
ty to that afforded students at the University of Texas. Factors considered
included: "reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position
and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and
prestige."34 "We hold that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that petitioner be admitted to the University of Texas Law
School."3
In another 1950 case, McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,36 an African-
American student pursuing a Doctorate in Education at the University of
Oklahoma was assigned to sit in a row in his classroom designated for black stu-
dents, and to sit at separate tables in the cafeteria and library. The Court held
"under these circumstances the Fourteenth Amendment precludes differences in
treatment by the state based upon race. Appellant ...must receive the same
treatment at the hands of the state as students of other races."38
29. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
30. Id. at 342.
31. Id. at 345.
32. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
33. Id. at 636.
34. Id. at 634.
35. Id. at 636.
36. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
37. Id. at 640.
38. Id. at 642.
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The United States was filled with tension in 1951. Citizens across the
nation were building bomb shelters in anticipation of the possibility of nuclear
attack. The nation felt threatened by the uncertainty of the Korean War and the
developing Cold War with the Soviet Union °.4  From 1953 through 1969, Earl
Warren was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.41 This was a time of constitu-
tional revolution "marked by the reemergence of the discourse of rights as a
dominant constitutional mode. 4 2
B. Circumstances in Topeka, Kansas
The main news of Topeka in 1951 was the unusual amount of rainfall plaguing
Kansas. 3 Rivers overflowed causing extensive flooding, ruining thousands of
acres of Kansas farmland and generating millions of dollars in damages. By
autumn, the waters had receded, but Kansans feared a recurrence. The enroll-
ment in Topeka's public schools set an unprecedented record that fall.4
Separate schools for African-American children were first established in
Kansas in 1867."s In 1951, seven and one-half percent of Topeka's population
consisted of African-Americans." There were several all black neighborhoods,
and some racially mixed communities. Other than public elementary education,
there were no Kansas statutes which discriminated on the basis of race.47 An
1879 statute was still in effect in Kansas, which allowed cities with populations
of more than 15,000 to maintain separate elementary schools for their white and
African-American children.' The "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy was an
acceptable norm across the country. 9
Of the twenty-two public elementary schools in Topeka in 1951, four were
maintained for African-American students only."0 These four schools were
located in the black neighborhoods. African-Americans were allowed to choose
which of the four schools they desired to attend. Free bus transportation was
provided, but stops were only made at specific locations and followed a set
schedule. 1 Often children, especially those living in racially mixed neighbor-
hoods, had long distances to walk before arriving at their bus stops.2 There was
no bus transportation for white children, but all attended their neighborhood
schools." The facilities and quality of education were considered equal in the
black and white schools."
39. Wilson, supra note 7, at 7.
40. Id.
41. Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 5, 5 (1993).
42. Id.
43. Wilson, supra note 7, at 7.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 8.
46. Id. at 9.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 8-9.
50. Id. at 9.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 11.
53. Id. at 9.
54. Id.
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Although the black citizens of Topeka were denied equal access to many
public places, and did not hold the best jobs, nor live in the most prestigious
neighborhoods, the black citizens were not militant."5 Most found life in Topeka
quite acceptable and lived peaceably among their white neighbors.
56
C. History Surrounding the Case
The local chapter of the NAACP of Topeka, Kansas, was contemplating a
strategy regarding the "separate but equal" philosophy at work in Topeka's pub-
lic schools in the late 1940's. 7 McKinley Burnett, the local chapter president,
had requested time to speak on the agenda of the local school board meetings.
Time and again, circumstances would prevent Burnett from speaking. Burnett,
along with his legal counsel, Elisha Scott, decided that an alternative plan of
action was warranted. 6 So, in the fall of 1950, thirteen families planned to test
the Kansas segregation law. Each family was asked to locate the nearest segre-
gated white school to their homes, and to take another adult with them in an
attempt to enroll their children in the schools. Once denied enrollment, a class
action suit followed.9
Oliver Brown and his family lived in a racially mixed neighborhood in
Topeka.6" Linda Brown began third grade in 1950. Prior to that, she had attend-
ed Monroe School, one of the four schools exclusively for African-American
children. The school was well-constructed and well-maintained. 1 Additionally,
the curriculum and the programs offered in the two schools were considered
comparable.62 However, Monroe School was located approximately twenty-one
blocks from the Brown residence.63 Sumner School, one designated for whites
only, was located about seven blocks away. ' In order to get to her bus stop,
Linda had to walk across a busy street and cross a railroad switchyard. Mr.
Brown was concerned for his daughter's safety. So, on the first day of school in
the 1950-1951 school year, Mr. Brown escorted his daughter to Sumner School
and requested that they enroll her. His request was denied, simply because
Linda was African-American.65
Oliver Brown was well respected by both blacks and whites in his communi-
ty.6 He was a minister and the assistant pastor of his church. He was non-mili-
tant, and was not a member of the NAACP.67 In 1950, he was only thirty-two
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Cheryl Brown Henderson, The Legacy of Brown Forty Six Years Later, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 70, 75 (2000).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Wilson, supra note 7, at 10.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 11.
63. Id. at 10.
64. Id. at 11.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 12.
67. Id.
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years old.' Sadly, Oliver Brown died in 1961, just ten years after the original
lawsuit was filed, and seven years after the famous Supreme Court decision. 9 He
only participated in one television interview prior to his death.7 He never lived
to realize the huge impact of the case on American education, nor on American
history.
III. THE Brown DECISION
Since the only way to receive a judgment on an issue is to have a case or
controversy come before a court, the NAACP knew they would need plaintiffs
in order to change the system of segregation in Topeka's schools.71 The plain-
tiffs had to be people suffering real injuries from the unlawful conduct of the
school board. Thus, as was previously mentioned, the NAACP recruited thirteen
Topeka families to attempt to enroll their African-American children in public
schools designated for white children only.7 2 As was anticipated, the white
schools denied enrollment to the children based on the issue of race alone.73
Interestingly, when Brown came before the Supreme Court, it represented a
joining of four separate cases. The four cases were from Delaware, Kansas,
South Carolina, and Virginia. A companion case, Boiling v. Sharpe,74 involved
the District of Columbia and was decided on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.7 ' The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, upon
which Brown was decided, applies only to the states.7 6
A. The Choice of Oliver Brown as Lead Plaintiff
Speculation has centered around why Oliver Brown was chosen to be the
lead plaintiff in the Kansas case. 77 There are numerous theories as to why
Brown was selected. One theory is that his name came first in alphabetical
order. The fallacy in this theory is that another parent, Darlene Brown, would
technically have come first had alphabetical order been used. Also, the second
through the fifth named parents in the lawsuit, Lawton, Emmanuel, Todd, and
Richardson, are definitely not alphabetically arranged.78 A second theory postu-
lates that Oliver was the first plaintiff the NAACP solicited. Still others hypoth-
esize that Oliver Brown was chosen because of his character. As previously
mentioned, he was considered a model citizen, well respected by blacks and
whites in the community.79 He could not be accused of being a militant, but,
68. Henderson, supra note 57, at 70.
69. Id. at 71.
70. Id.
71. Wilson, supra note 7, at 11-12.
72. Id. at 12.
73. Id.
74. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
75. Id. at 500.
76. Wilson, supra note 7, at 13.
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rather, he had lived a peaceful life in Topeka.8" Thus, careful strategy would
have selected such a plaintiff to represent a controversial cause. Others say it
was mere coincidence that Brown's name was selected.81 In fact, Charles Scott,
one of the plaintiffs' attorneys, told defense attorney, Wilson, in an undocument-
ed conversation, that there was no explanation for the order in which plaintiffs'
names appeared in the caption.82
The Brown family, however, believes that Oliver was chosen because he
was the only man among the plaintiffs.' Thus, they suggest that sexism played
a role in the decision to use Brown's name. Cheryl Brown Henderson, the
youngest daughter of Oliver Brown, explains:
Although my father's role in truth was minimal, the legacy
of Brown is one that we have grown to bear proudly. The
responsibility we have assumed is that of telling the Brown
story as it truly happened. The reality is much more profound
than the press creation. It does make one wonder how many
other events in our history were concocted and then repeated as
fact. 4
B. The Choice of Kansas
Why was Kansas chosen? Again speculation comes into play. South
Carolina, as many states in the deep South, required segregation in all of its
schools, elementary and secondary.8" Virginia also required segregation, but the
case brought before the Supreme Court only involved students in high school.
Delaware, a state which had not seceded from the Union, was a former slave
state. It also had required segregation in its public schools.86 Kansas, however,
was unique among the states where controversies had developed. Kansas did
not require segregation. Its laws permitted some communities to maintain segre-
gated elementary schools.87 Also, of the four state cases consolidated into
Brown, only the Kansas court found no substantial inequalities among the
schools. It is interesting to note that Kansas was a relatively peaceful state.
Kansas had sent more troops to the Union Army than any other state during the
Civil War.88 The white and black populations seemed to live harmoniously with
each other.89 The black population was relatively small.8 Thus, resistance was
80. Id.
81. Id. at 13.
82. Id. at 12-13.
83. Henderson, supra note 57, at 76.
84. Id.




89. Id. at 9.
90. Id. at 14.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W RE VIEW
expected to be less in Kansas than in any of the other states involved." Another
interesting aspect of the Kansas case was that the facilities designated for whites
and blacks were not considered unequal. 2 Thus, Kansas truly implemented the
"separate but equal" doctrine in schools where segregation was practiced. 3
C. The Trial Court's Decision
The plaintiffs in Brown sought no affirmative relief 4 Their simple prayer
was that the Kansas statute permitting segregated elementary schools be
declared unconstitutional, that the court find Topeka's dual system of separate
schools unlawful, and that the Topeka school board be enjoined from continuing
operation of racially segregated schools.9
Important to the case was the testimony of several expert witnesses regard-
ing the psychological impact of segregation on the African-American children.96
All of the experts testified that enforced segregation had a negative impact on
the motivation of the black children to learn.97 Following is an excerpt from the
testimony of Louisa Holt, a social psychologist who was a member of the faculty
at the University of Kansas:
The fact that [segregation] is enforced, that it is legal, I think has
more importance than the mere fact of segregation by itself does
because this gives legal and official sanction to a policy which
inevitably is interpreted both by white people and by Negroes as
denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. Were it not for the
sense that one group is inferior to the other, there would be no
basis, and I am not granting that this is a rational basis, for such
segregation.... A sense of inferiority must always affect one's
motivation for learning since it affects the feeling one has of one's
self as a person, as a personality or a self or an ego identity.9
The trial court found that the education of the black and white students in
Topeka's dual system was equal.99 The quality of instruction, qualifications of
the teachers, and physical facilities were deemed comparable. The curriculum
was identical. Bus transportation was provided to the black children, but not to
the white children."' The court then made a historic ruling regarding Finding of
Fact No. VIII:
91. Id.
92. Id. at 9.
93. Id. at 7 (note the reference in note 14 to an interview with The Honorable Constance Baker Motley,
Senior Judge, S.D.N.Y., on September 24, 1990).
94. Id. at 14.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 18.
97. Wilson, supra note 7, at 18.
98. Id. (citing Transcript of Record at 98, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. T-316 Civ.,
D. Kan.) [hereinafter TR]).
99. Id. at 20.
100. Id.
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Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has
a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is
greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of sep-
arating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority
of the Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation
of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, there-
fore, has a tendency to retard the educational and mental devel-
opment of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the
benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school sys-
tem.1
01
(The United States Supreme Court would later quote this language in Brown
L)"02 Despite this finding, the court was bound by legal precedent."2 With deci-
sions such as Plessy and Gong Lum to follow, the court upheld Topeka's segre-
gation policy.T "
The trial court's decision, while on the surface appearing to be a defeat for
the plaintiffs, may have been a victory. Had the plaintiffs won at the trial court
level, the case may not have been taken to the United States Supreme Court.0 5
The constitutionality of segregation per se, therefore, may not have been deter-
mined in 1954. Also, the case drew local attention to the policy of segregation in
Topeka's elementary schools. ' Many concerned citizens began to question the
validity of the enforced segregation policy of the local schools. The climate was
becoming conducive to change. 7
D. Brown I
As previously noted, Brown is a consolidation of four separate cases. The
cases are based on different factual scenarios, but they share a common legal
question. In each case, African-American children were denied admission to all
white schools due to required or permitted segregation laws. Plaintiffs claimed
their rights to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated.
The Court's opinion was delivered by Chief Justice Earl Warren."°8
The South Carolina case that was involved in Brown was Briggs v. Elliott.'
In this case, two African-American children living in Clarendon County, South
Carolina, contested the constitutionality of a South Carolina statute and a provi-
sion in the state's constitution which required segregation of children in South
Carolina's public schools."0 The District Court found the schools for African-
101. Id. (citing TR at 245); see also Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494.
102. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494.
103. Wilson, supra note 7, at 20.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 21.
106. Id. at20-21.
107. Id. at 21.
108. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 486.
109. 103 F. Supp. 920 (D.C.S.C. 1952).
110. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 486.
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Americans inferior to those provided for white students. The Court ordered the
school board to provide equal facilities, but denied admission of the plaintiffs to
the white schools during the equalization process...1 "On remand, the District
Court found that substantial equality had been achieved except for buildings and
that the defendants were proceeding to rectify this inequality as well." '112
The Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board," 3 involved high school
students, again challenging a state statute and a state constitutional provision
mandating racial segregation of black and white students in public schools. As
in South Carolina, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, found educational inequalities and ordered equalization, but denied the
plaintiffs admission to the white schools during the process. "4 The case was
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court."'
In the Delaware case of Gebhart v. Belton,"6 elementary and high school age
children of New Castle County, Delaware, contested that state's constitutional
and statutory provisions requiring public school segregation. "7 The court found
the existence of educational inequities regarding physical facilities, teacher qual-
ifications, extracurricular activities, pupil-teacher ratios, and the distances trav-
eled by students to school. 8 This court, however, in addition to ordering equal-
ization, ordered the admission of the plaintiffs to the white schools while equal-
ization was taking place. The defendants claimed the courts erred in requiring
them to admit the black students during the equalization process." 9 The case
was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.'20
The common question in all four cases was: "Does segregation of children
in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities
and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority
group of equal educational opportunities?"' 2 The "separate but equal" doctrine
of Plessy was under constitutional scrutiny.
22
The Court began by examining the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It found the history regarding the intended relationship of the
Amendment to public education inconclusive. "[A]t the time of the Amendment
... the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing today..
[I]t is not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.1 23
111. Id. at 486-87.
112. Id. at487.
113. 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952).
114. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 487.
115. Id.
116. 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952).
117. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 487.
118. Id. at 487-88.
119. Id. at 488.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 493.
122. Id. at491.
123. Id. at 490.
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Therefore, the Court decided to address the effect of segregation on the nation's
public schools.124
The Court expounded on the importance of education in modem society:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance
laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate
our recognition of the importance of education to our democrat-
ic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is
the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in prepar-
ing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if
he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportu-
nity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be available to all on equal terms.12
The Court then addressed the psychological research which had been pre-
sented in the trial court in Brown.26 "To separate [students] from others of simi-
lar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of infe-
riority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds
in a way unlikely ever to be undone." '27
The Court then issued its historic holding:
We conclude that in the field of public education the doc-
trine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the
plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions
have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained
of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.'28
Therefore, mandatory segregation of students by race in public education was
deemed unconstitutional.'2 9 This historic decision eliminated the "separate but
equal" doctrine of Plessy in public education. However, the Court did not
declare when segregation would have to be achieved. This was left for Brown
11.130
124. Id. at 492.
125. Id. at 493.
126. Id. at 494.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 495.
129. Id.
130. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294.
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E. Brown II
Chief Justice Earl Warren again delivered the opinion of the Court.131 The
Court began by restating the holding of Brown I, and by defining the question
presented: "[T]he fundamental principle that racial discrimination in public edu-
cation is unconstitutional [is] incorporated herein by reference. All provisions of
federal, state, or local law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield
to this principle. There remains for consideration the manner in which relief is
to be accorded."1 32
The Court assigned jurisdiction to the local Federal District Courts to assure
local compliance with desegregation of the public schools:
Full implementation of these constitutional principles may
require solution of varied local school problems. School author-
ities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing,
and solving these problems; courts will have to consider whether
the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implemen-
tation of the governing constitutional principles. Because of
their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for fur-
ther hearings, the courts which originally heard these cases can
best perform this judicial appraisal. Accordingly, we believe it
appropriate to remand the cases to those courts."
The Court recognized that time may be necessary in order to effectuate the
transition.
[T]he courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry
out the ruling in an effective manner. The burden rests upon the
defendants to establish that such time is necessary in the public
interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earli-
est practicable date. To that end, courts may consider problems
related to administration, arising from the physical condition of
the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel,
revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact
units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public
schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regu-
lations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing prob-
lems. They will also consider the adequacy of any plans the
defendants may propose to meet these problems and to effectu-
ate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system.'"
131. Id.
132. Id. at 298.
133. Id. at 299.
134. Id. at 300-01.
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The most famous language of Brown II was that local school systems must
implement desegregation "with all deliberate speed.1 15 Many years would pass,
however, but the full realization of desegregation would not be achieved.
IV. AFTERMATH OF Brown
Reaction to Brown was varied and widespread. It ranged from actions by
private citizens to subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Brown's legacy was
both anticipated, and unanticipated.'36
A. Violent Reactions of Private Citizens
The most unfortunate reaction to Brown's implementation was violence.
For example, John Kasper, a noted white supremacist, traveled to various places
throughout the country in an effort to incite violence. His objective was to
intimidate African-American students and place them in fear of attempting to
enter all white schools. One of his visits was to Clinton, Tennessee, where he
incited violent resistance to the integration of Clinton High School. Riots, beat-
ings, harassment of black students, and death threats delivered to school officials
followed. The National Guard had to be called in to restore order so that deseg-
regation could proceed.137
In 1957, Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas engaged the National Guard to
prevent the integration of Little Rock Central High School. There were only
nine African-American students attempting to enroll. President Eisenhower
responded by sending federal troops to the scene so that desegregation efforts
could continue. 38
"'Two, four, six, eight, we don't want to integrate!'" were the angry words
of hatred that echoed in the ears of six-year-old Ruby Bridges as she was escort-
ed into William Frantz Elementary School by white federal marshals on
November 14, 1960.13' Ruby was a first grade student on the day the public
schools of New Orleans were being integrated. She was confused as to why she
spent most of the day in the principal's office, and even more confused when she
found she was the only student in her class. Ruby Bridges Hall still remembers
the painful experience she endured. She also remembers the ramifications suf-
fered by her family. Her father, Abon Bridges, was fired from his job. Her
grandparents, who had been sharecroppers for twenty-five years, were forced to
leave the farm. 4 This incident inspired famous artist, Norman Rockwell, to cre-
ate his well-known painting, The Problem We All Live With, which is a depiction
of Ruby entering the school that tumultuous day.
135. Id. at 301.
136. Henderson, supra note 57, at 71.
137. OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR. & JOHN M. SCHEB II, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 746 (2d ed. 1999).
138. Id.
139. Karla Sikaffy, Still I Rise: Ruby Bridges' Fate, Driftwood Newscope, at http://www.uno.edu/-
drif/1997/feb6/ruby.htm (Feb. 6, 1997); see also http://www.rubybridges.org (visited Feb. 29, 2004).
140. Id.
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B. Subsequent Supreme Court Decisions
In response to what appeared to be purposeful delays by various school dis-
tricts across the nation, the United States Supreme Court, in Alexander v.
Holmes County Board of Education,14' mandated in 1969 that desegregation be
implemented "at once" as opposed to "with all deliberate speed" as directed in
Brown.'42 "[C]ontinued operation of segregated schools under a standard of
allowing 'all deliberate speed' for desegregation is no longer constitutionally
permissible. Under explicit holdings of this Court the obligation of every school
district is to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate now and here-
after only unitary schools."'4 3 This case was in response to "the denial of funda-
mental rights to many thousands of school children, who [were] . . .attending
Mississippi schools under segregated conditions contrary to the applicable deci-
sions of this Court."'1"
Then came the controversial holding of the Court in 1971 in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. 45 This case involved the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg school system of Charlotte, North Carolina. In 1971, the district
was comprised of 29% African-American children." However, most of these
children attended schools which were 99% black.147 In this case, the Court
approved the federal district court's ordered busing as an acceptable means to
achieve racial desegregation in the public schools.'" "[W]e find no basis for
holding that the local school authorities may not be required to employ bus
transportation as one tool of school desegregation.'
'1 49
The same result was achieved in Keyes v. School District Number 1.5 In
that case, a federal district court had ordered busing to achieve desegregation
when it determined that segregation of the district's schools was de jure.15
"[T]he differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto
segregation ... is purpose or intent to segregate."' 52 The Supreme Court ruled
that busing was an effective tool for eliminating such dejure segregation."
Then in 1974, the Court decided to place limitations on the use of court
ordered busing by federal district courts." In Milliken v. Bradley, the Court
held that court ordered busing across district lines was permissible only if the
districts involved had been guilty of dejure segregation in the past.' This case
involved court ordered busing of students in Detroit, Michigan. 6
141. 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
142. Id. at 20.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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Busing has proven to be a controversial issue among both blacks and whites
in contemporary society. Many African-Americans object to the implication
that black students cannot obtain a quality education without the presence of
white students in the classroom. Justice Clarence Thomas, in his concurring
opinion in Missouri v. Jenkins, 7 opines: "It never ceases to amaze me that the
courts are so willing to assume that anything that is predominantly black must be
inferior."'"
Significantly, in 1991, the Supreme Court, in Board of Education v.
Dowell, '9 held that "[desegregation] decrees ... are not intended to operate in
perpetuity."'' 0 The Court then authorized federal district courts to cease supervi-
sion of local school districts with regard to desegregation efforts if: "the Board
ha[s] complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered,
and [if] the vestiges of past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent
practicable.' 6. Thus, if a school board proves it put forth a good faith effort to
comply with desegregation decrees, it can regain local control and discontinue
under the supervision of the federal district court.
Another significant case is Freeman v. Pitts."2 In this case, the Court deter-
mined that federal district courts may discontinue supervision of local school
districts where segregation in the district is the result of de facto as opposed to
dejure segregation." Defacto segregation can occur due to the ethnic make-up
of neighborhoods. Dejure segregation, on the other hand, is intentional segre-
gation for the sake of segregation.
Racial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake. It is to be
pursued when racial. imbalance has been caused by a constitu-
tional violation. Once the racial imbalance due to the de jure
violation has been remedied, the school district is under no duty
to remedy imbalance that is caused by demographic factors.
Where resegregation is a product not of state action but of pri-
vate choices, it does not have constitutional implications. It is
beyond the authority and beyond the practical ability of the fed-
eral courts to try to counteract these kinds of continuous and
massive demographic shifts. To attempt such results would
require ongoing and never-ending supervision by the courts of
school districts simply because they were once de jure segregat-
157. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
158. Id. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring).
159. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
160. Id. at 248.
161. Id. at 249-50.
162. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
163. Id.
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ed. Residential housing choices, and their attendant effects on
racial composition of schools, present an ever-changing pattern,
one difficult to address through judicial remedies."
Missouri v. Jenkins165 was a 1995 case involving school desegregation in
Kansas City, Missouri. 6 The Supreme Court found that the federal district
judge overstepped the district court's authority in attempting to implement spe-
cific remedial measures. 7 One of the measures in controversy was the creation
of numerous magnet schools within the school district.'" "'Magnet schools,' as
generally understood, are public schools of voluntary enrollment designed to
promote integration by drawing students away from their neighborhoods and pri-
vate schools through distinctive curricula and high quality.' 16 Every high
school in the district, every middle school, and one-half of the elementary
schools were turned into magnet schools. 7 ' In effect, the district was trans-
formed into a "magnet district" designed to create a system that was equal or
superior to those surrounding it.'7' The Court found, however, that this program
was designed to attract students from outside the district.'72 The prior de jure
segregation was an intradistrict as opposed to an interdistrict violation.73 The
Court, therefore, deemed the remedy impermissible.'74 Justice Clarence Thomas
wrote a lengthy concurrence which will be dealt with in the next section of this
article.
C. The Legacy of Brown
According to Cheryl Brown Henderson, Brown's legacy was both anticipated
and unanticipated:
The Supreme Court's ruling in Brown had an impact on: equity
in public transportation (1956); 1964 Civil Rights Act; 1965
Voting Rights Act; 1972 Civil Rights Title IX; 1973 Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act; 1975 Age Discrimination Act;
and 1984 Civil Rights Restoration Act, which did not become
law until 1988. This litany although not inclusive represents a
period of opportunity rarely seen before Brown in 1954. 'T
164. Id. at 494-95.
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The unanticipated legacy includes the following:
1. School closings.
2. White flight.
3. Barrier creating school boundaries.
4. Municipal decisions to build low income housing in
certain areas.
5. Busing suddenly as a tool for integration becomes
unacceptable when it had been acceptable as a tool
for segregation.
6. Withholding resources of time, attention, and money.
7. The scarcity of African-American teachers.
8. The effects of an antiquated system of school finance.
9. The majority of African-American students remain-
ing in segregated schools.
[10]. A proliferation of private schools.
[11]. The Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
case.
[12]. The concept of magnet schools.
[13]. African-American male academies.
1 76
The positive legacy of Brown remains paramount in American history.
"[D]esegregated schools could not coexist with segregated local buses, recre-
ational facilities, and lunch counters. Once Brown had put a hole into the dam
of segregation, even the Supreme Court's 'all deliberate speed' doctrine could
not hold back the dawn of a new day."" 7 We cannot, however, ignore that many
view "[t]he most insidious unanticipated legacy [a]s the continual effort to
somehow show that African-Americans simply are not capable of intellectual
achievement." '78 It is this unanticipated legacy that has generated the recent con-
troversies regarding the aftermath of Brown.
V. MODERN IMPLICATIONS: Missouri v. Jenkins
It has been fifty years since the Court issued its famous opinion in Brown.
Today, the language and many of the precepts of Brown are being revisited in
light of twenty-first century America. The critics of Brown generally cite three
sources of dissatisfaction:
(1) Brown is a "sociological" opinion that relied on questionable
social science data ... (2) Brown did not accurately express the
"intent" of those who proposed and eventually adopted the
176. Id. at 76 (footnotes omitted).
177. Constance Baker Motley, The Historical Setting of Brown and its Impact on the Supreme Court's
Decision, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 9, 17 (1992).
178. Henderson, supra note 57, at 77.
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Fourteenth Amendment... [and] [3] Segregation of whites and
blacks in public schools persisted in the northern states of the
country well into the twentieth century as it did in the South.'79
The most troubling aspect of the controversy surrounding Brown centers
around the expert testimony of the social scientists. 8 ' These psychologists
maintained that African-American children segregated for educational purposes
solely because of race developed feelings of inferiority. 8 ' This weakened self-
concept yielded a lack of motivation to learn.'82 What the expert testimony
failed to recognize was that there were mutual benefits to be gained from inte-
gration." This led the courts to later implement remedial measures designed to
balance the number of blacks and whites in the schools. 1" "[T]he Court was per-
suaded in Brown I by social science evidence that included a subtext which
asserted white superiority. This unstated assumption is premised on a belief that
physical proximity to white children offered remedial benefits to black chil-
dren's self esteem, learning motivation, and mental ability."'88
The late Professor Norman C. Amaker, an African-American former
Professor of Law at Loyola University of Chicago, stated in a 1995 article in the
Southern Illinois University Law Journal: "I want to say straightaway, without
any 'backing and filling,' throat clearing 'ahem,' 'hemming and hawing,' equiv-
ocation, or hidden reservations, that both the decision and the opinion in Brown
v. Board of Education were right.""18 Professor Amaker felt the critics had been
too hard on Brown. 87 The ghost of the late Chief Justice Earl Warren, he said,
"must rise and shake its head in wonderment and amazement as it haunts every
session of law-trained academics who question in solemn tones his work product
of ... years ago . .. ."' The Court had to deal with society as it was in 1954,
and with precedent as it existed then. The questions presented had to be
answered on the basis of:
(1) the language of a constitutional amendment whose purpose
was well known and understood by the Court from its earliest
construction of the language;
(2) the history - in which law had played a major role - that
since the introduction of slavery had meant the imposition on
black Americans of a status of inferiority in every conceivable
aspect of human existence;
179. Norman C. Amaker, The Haunting Presence of the Opinion of Brown v. Board of Education, 20 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 3, 4 (1995) (footnote omitted).
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(3) the logic that a court that was aware of the dominant role
law had played in making indurate notions of racial inferiority
in society, clearly realized that law was now required to play a
different role if these notions were to be dissipated;
(4) the social conditions that informed the Court of the rigidly
segregated system of public schools with inferior resources for
black children, many of whom were bussed past more closely
located schools for white children with resources superior in
every respect;
(5) the precedent, cited by the Court, that had been building
since 1938, which clearly had eroded the force of earlier prece-
dent, particularly Plessy; and
(6) the clarity to the Court, that the equal part of the "separate-
but-equal" canard, as was predictable given the nation's racial
history, had been blatantly ignored so that generations of black
children had been locked into a process that amounted to little or
no education in any meaningful sense.'89
Professor Amaker also explained that the African-American parents who
filed suit on behalf of their children:
[C]learly understood the unmistakable facts of their lives ...
that racial segregation in the public schools assumed their inferi-
ority and that of their children and meant unequal educational
opportunities for their children . . .[and] that separation
inevitably meant inferior treatment because people with the
power of decision only segregate people they consider inferior
and undesirable. 190
Professor Amaker seemed to be saying that the Justices in Brown did the
best they could, given surrounding circumstances. According to Amaker, the
opinion was one of "simplicity and common sense."'' It arrived in five steps:
The Fourteenth Amendment says that a state shall not deny the
equal protection of its laws to any person within its jurisdiction
(step 1); racial segregation by law, or by official action or cus-
tom having the force of law, denies equality to the persons seg-
regated (step 2); the states involved in Brown were enforcing
segregation by law (step 3); black children in those states were
"persons" (step 4); therefore, the states were denying the equal
protection of the laws (final step.)
92
189. Id. at 11 (footnotes omitted).
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Having himself argued many post-Brown school desegregation cases,
Professor Amaker cautioned contemporary critics of the opinion:
There is a wide gulf between the real life responsibility of a
judge to write an opinion deciding momentous constitutional
questions that will affect people throughout the nation and also
gain the assent of a majority, let alone, a unanimity of a court,
and an opinion written in hindsight by others without such
responsibility that they may find more intellectually satisfying
.... The ghost of the late Chief Justice should be allowed to
return to its resting place .... 193
Michael A. Middleton, Deputy Chancellor and Professor of Law at the
University of Missouri-Columbia, agrees that the Brown decision was not
"wrongly decided [nor] .. .its strategists .. .misdirected."'" In a 1995 article
in the Southern Illinois University Law Journal, he explains:
[W]hile integration may well have been the best strategy to
address the concerns of the African-American community in
1954,... [t]here are circumstances in which a... determination
to achieve integration works against the goal of improving edu-
cational opportunity....
[A]n inflexible allegiance to the ideal of integration that
produces an impediment to the maximization of educational
opportunity for African-American children is wrong. The
Brown opinion could have been written so as to provide the
flexibility that is needed to create educationally effective reme-
dies for the vestiges of segregation. 9
Professor Middleton suggests that, had Brown identified the constitutional
violation involved without emphasizing the harm done by segregation to
African-American children, it could have avoided much of the criticism of the
opinion that has arisen in modern times.196 Middleton suggests that the harm of
segregation in 1954 generated from the poorly funded and undervalued schools
attended by African-American children.'97 Also, the educational system of 1954
was not responsive to the needs of black children, whose heritage included slav-
ery, racism, and segregation in virtually all aspects of life. 99 Finally, if a child's
education is impaired by lack of exposure to other races, segregation inhibited
the education of all children, not just those of the African-American race.'99
193. Id. at 13-14.
194. Michael A. Middleton, Brown v. Board: Revisited, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 19, 22 (1995).
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My concern is that policymakers, lawyers, and judges,
because of the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Brown v.
Board of Education and the confirming interpretations of that
decision over the past several decades, have a fixation on inte-
gration as the primary remedy for school segregation. It is as if
we actually believe that the damaging effects of segregation in
American education and the resultant complexities involved in
educating America's diverse youth can be corrected by the sim-
ple expedient of appropriately mixing Black and White bodies.
While no one can dispute that the ideal of integration should be
vigorously pursued, I am concerned that pursuit of that ideal,
with what appears at times to be a myopic zeal, may hamper the
development of potentially effective remedies for the lingering
effects of segregation .... [B]lind allegiance to the integration
ideal ... has accomplished relatively little in terms of achieving
a truly integrated public education system."
Due to various factors in our society, American schools have not become
fully integrated, nor have educational opportunities become equalized.2 1
Segregation by both race and income persists. 2 The objectives of the remedies
employed to correct the educational inequalities that existed in 1954 have not
been fulfilled.2"
Many critics of strict integration policies advocate more of an emphasis on
the quality of education in the predominantly black schools, than on strict adher-
ence to integration for the sake of integration alone. Those who prefer a more
integrated approach feel that desegregation has not been allotted adequate time
or resources to ensure its success. Proposed alternatives to improving the quali-
ty of contemporary schools have included the educational voucher or the con-
trolled choice plan. Many feel the current emphasis on multicultural education
should be employed to teach all children about a variety of cultures and thus fos-
ter a sense of pride in one's own heritage as well as an appreciation for the con-
tributions of others. Still others suggest afro centrism as a means of motivating
black students by focusing on the achievement of fellow African-Americans. "
Justice Clarence Thomas best summed up the controversy in his lengthy
concurring opinion from Missouri v. Jenkins:
It never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing to
assume that anything that is predominantly black must be inferi-
or. Instead of focusing on remedying the harm done to those
black schoolchildren injured by segregation, the District Court
200. Id. at 21.
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here sought to convert the Kansas City, Missouri, School
District (KCMSD) into a "magnet district" that would reverse
the "white flight" caused by desegregation. In this respect, I
join the Court's decision concerning the two remedial issues
presented for review. I write separately, however, to add a few
thoughts with respect to the overall course of this litigation. In
order to evaluate the scope of the remedy, we must understand
the scope of the constitutional violation and the nature of the
remedial powers of the federal courts.
Two threads in our jurisprudence have produced this unfor-
tunate situation, in which a District Court has taken it upon itself
to experiment with the education of the KCMSD's black youth.
First, the court has read our cases to support the theory that
black students suffer an unspecified psychological harm from
segregation that retards their mental and educational develop-
ment. This approach not only relies upon questionable social
science research rather than constitutional principle, but it also
rests on an assumption of black inferiority. Second, we have
permitted the federal courts to exercise virtually unlimited equi-
table powers to remedy this alleged constitutional violation.
The exercise of this authority has trampled upon principles of
federalism and the separation of powers and has freed courts to
pursue other agendas unrelated to the narrow purpose of precise-
ly remedying a constitutional harm....
The mere fact that a school is black does not mean that it is
the product of a constitutional violation. A "racial imbalance
does not itself establish a violation of the Constitution." ...
Instead, in order to find unconstitutional segregation, we require
plaintiffs "prove all of the essential elements of a de jure segre-
gation - that is, stated simply, a current condition of segregation
resulting from intentional state action directed specifically to
the [allegedly segregated] schools." . . . "[T]he differentiating
factor between dejure segregation and so-called defacto segre-
gation.. . is purpose or intent to segregate.""2 '
The question presented seems to be: Does segregation, in and of itself, pro-
duce an inferior education, or is it the intentional de jure segregation for the sole
purpose of segregating the races that creates the harm? The author postulates
that the latter is the source of harm.
205. 515 U.S. 70, 114-15 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (first emphasis added by Justice
Thomas) (second emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The importance of education in our modem society cannot be overly empha-
sized. Although the Supreme Court of the United States has found that education
is not a fundamental right guaranteed to United States citizens by the U.S.
Constitution,0 6 the Court has heralded its importance to the survival of our soci-
ety. "Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments.... In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. 2 7
To purposefully segregate children from each other for senseless reasons,
such as race, is inexcusable. It is the author's opinion that exposing a child to
various cultures enriches and completes that child's education. It is incorrect to
assume, however, that, because a child is educated in an environment dominated
by one particular racial group, that education is necessarily inferior, much less
unconstitutional. It is the intentional de jure segregation that violates constitu-
tional principles. In this, the author agrees with Justice Thomas.
The author also finds herself in agreement with Professor Norman C.
Amaker. The Brown decision was a profound turning point in American educa-
tion, and in American life. It "put a hole into the dam of segregation, ' '2' and her-
alded "the dawn of a new day."'  Its importance and its profound positive lega-
cy cannot be overlooked.
Finally, the author agrees with Professor Michael A. Middleton. The Brown
decision should have relied more heavily on the constitutional violation than on
the social science research. Indeed, the case could have been decided solely on
the basis of constitutionality. The harm caused by de jure segregation should
have been acknowledged, but it should have been applied to all races. All races
suffer from intentional segregation for the sake of segregation.
"To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the
heaven: ... A time to get, and a time to lose; a time to keep, and a time to cast
away[.] ' '21 1 Perhaps the time has come to cast away the vestiges of the past.
Perhaps the time has come to read Brown as saying that intentional, dejure seg-
regation, or prejudice of any kind, is harmful to the education of all, regardless of
race, ethnic background, or gender. Perhaps it is also time to recognize that edu-
cation goes beyond the schools to all aspects of life. Perhaps it is time to learn
from the children.
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